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Abstract
The recent financial crisis has forced a rethink of banking
regulation and supervision and the role of financial innovation.
We develop a model where prudent banks may signal their type
through high capital ratios. Capital regulation may ensure sepa-
ration in equilibrium but deposit insurance will tend to increase
the level of capital required. If supervision detects risky be-
haviour ex ante then it is complementary to capital regulation.
However, financial innovation may erode supervisors’ ability to
detect risk and capital levels should then be higher. But regu-
lators may not be aware their capacities have been undermined.
We argue for a four-prong policy response with higher bank cap-
ital ratios, enhanced supervision, limits to the use of complex
financial instruments and Coco’s. Our results may support the
institutional arrangements proposed recently in the UK.
Key Words: Bank Regulation, Financial Crises, Information,
Signaling.
JEL Codes: D82, G21, G38, L51
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has placed financial innovation under a new
light. While before the crisis, many analysts considered that financial
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berto Martin, Alaistair Milne and participants of the LSE Regulatory Policy Work-
shop for very useful comments. We are grateful to financial support from the ESRC
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innovation was making finance more efficient by separating, re-bundling
and spreading risks to different investors with different risk-bearing ca-
pacities, in hindsight much of this innovation is now seen more as a
means to arbitrage regulations or simply to hide risks from the relevant
regulators. Indeed the fact that this has truly only been revealed in
hindsight illustrates the asymmetric information nature of the problem.
The regulators appeared to be unaware of the implications of what was
happening. The general public and the large number of investors includ-
ing depositors in those financial institutions that eventually either failed
or required public money to stay afloat, also did not appear to know or
understand the consequences. The rating agencies, charged precisely
with attempting to analyse bank risk also appeared to be unaware of
the problem. For example, Sinn (2010) details the 2007 Standard and
Poor’s ratings of Bear Sterns (A), Lehman Brothers (A+) and Merryl
Lynch (AA+); all bankrupt before the end of 20081.
In general, the literature on banking has stressed information asym-
metries and in particular the role of “relationships” between banks and
their clients. On the one hand, these relationships may afford banks
supra-normal profits but on the other hand it surely also poses signifi-
cant problems for depositors and bank regulators to know what the bank
is doing. Banks know their own risks better than anyone including regu-
lators and no doubt there are competent banks that both calculate and
manage their risks effectively. But the information asymmetries also al-
low for banks who may take greater risks and yet pass themselves off as
one of the more prudent institutions, at least until their luck runs out2.
Financial innovation has exacerbated this problem. The development
of derivatives, structured products such as CDO’s and SDO’s and the
possibility of securitisation essentially allows banks to modify at will the
probability distribution of the returns of their loan portfolios. Given the
extent and the complexity of these transactions, it has become more and
more difficult for the regulator to be able to distinguish between a well-
managed, prudent bank with a safe loan book and one that gambles3.
The existence of deposit insurance may also amplify the problem as
with deposit insurance the reliance on supervisory discipline, as opposed
to market discipline, is much greater. But given the information asym-
metries, supervisory discipline is particularly difficult. Having said that,
1Moody’s ratings reveal a similar story: Bear Sterns (A2), Lehman (A1) and
Merrill Lynch (A1). An alternative view is that the rating agencies knew the risks
but due to their own incentive problems did not wish to reveal the problem.
2These ideas follow closely those of Beliamin (2005), Hughes (1997), Hellman et
al (2000), Sinn (2010) and Miller et al (2011) applying the classic lemons model of
Ackerlof (1970) and signalling model of Spence (1973) to banking.
3On a somewhat related view of financial innovation see for example Rajan (2010).
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it is not clear whether market discipline can fare much better. Arguably,
an important role of market discipline is to control supervisory forbear-
ance - the case where the supervisor does realise that an entity may have
problems but delays to act.
In this paper we develop a signalling type model of banking where su-
pervisors cannot distinguish between prudent banks that operate a safe
loan book and risky banks that may mimic the prudent ones until their
luck runs out. We argue that the regulator may allow prudent banks
to differentiate themselves from the mimics by establishing minimum
capital requirements. Still, regulators may prefer a pooling equilibrium
depending on parameter values and in that case supervision is com-
plementary to capital regulation. However, we suggest that financial
innovation may have undermined supervision. The model suggests that
regulators may need to limit banks’ use of complex instruments in order
to be able to supervise effectively and hence can adopt lower capital
requirements or adopt very high minimum capital requirements to drive
out risky banks from the market.
In a broader discussion regarding regulatory alternatives we argue for
a four-prong approach (a) core banks should be much more restricted
in the instruments that they use and both institutional and instrument
complexity should be severely reduced (b) banks should be subject to
significantly higher capital requirements (c) supervision needs to be con-
sidered in a different light, as complementary to capital requirements,
and if supervisors do not feel comfortable assessing the overall risk of an
institution then this indicates that the rules limiting complexity are not
strong enough and (d) we advocate for the use of Coco’s and suggest
that market discipline should be seen as complementary to supervisory
discipline. The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we
develop a simple benchmark model. In stages, we then include banking
(capital) regulation, deposit insurance, banking supervision and finally,
financial innovation. In a concluding section we discuss the policy im-
plications of the analysis.
2 The model
2.1 On the role of capital regulation
Let us suppose that there are a continuum of identical banks [0, 1]. Each
bank has access to 1 unit of depositors’ funds and the banks’ owners
contribute k units of capital. All funds are employed to make loans
such that the capital to assets ratio of the bank is then k/(1 + k). We
assume there is an exogenous gross cost of capital of η > r where r is
the gross riskless rate of interest, r ≥ 1. There are two types of banks.
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Prudent banks have identified good borrowers and can lend to them with
no risk at a gross lending rate α, where η > α > r. These assumptions
follow Hellman et al (2000) - henceforth HMS. However there are other
banks that do not have access to such good borrowers. They may only
attempt to mimic the good banks. We assume that they may make risky
loans or make risky bets that yield the riskless rate of interest in expected
terms. With probability p the payoff from such activities is β but with
probability (1−p) the payoff is 0 and the condition p = r/β ensures that
the expected return is equal to the riskless rate with 0 < p < 1, β > r.
We assume that α, β are the returns on the bank’s entire loan portfolio
and that p is the overall probability of the overall loan portfolio failing.
Let us assume that there are ω prudent banks in the population and
(1 − ω) risk-taking banks. We assume that depositors do not know
which banks are the prudent ones and which are the risk taking ones,
however as we assume that equity is all insider-equity we assume that the
equity-holders are aware of the nature of their own bank. We assume
that depositors are aware of the amount of capital, deposits and assets
and they are aware of the potential returns in the population (α and β);
they are only unaware whether the loans made from a particular bank
are the safe or the risky type.
If there is a pooling equilibrium then the risky banks must set β = α
so that they mimic the prudent banks and can go undetected. This then
implies that they obtain a gross return of α on their assets with proba-
bility p and zero otherwise. In the absence of deposit insurance, in the
pooling equilibrium the minimum deposit rate required by depositors,
rd, assuming their opportunity cost is the riskless rate of interest, would
be given by the equation, r = ωrd + (1 − ω)prd where we assume that
if each bank’s loans pay zero then the bank defaults and pays deposi-
tors zero, and hence rd = r/ (ω + (1− ω)p). It can be shown that for
ω < 1, rd < α. We will assume that rd is indeed the deposit rate which
implies that banks may potentially earn supra-normal rents in equilib-
rium which we assume are not dissipated through entry. We consider
that the information asymmetries in relationship banking also constitute
a barrier to entry for new banks, at least for the case of prudent banks.
We understand there is less justification for such entry costs for the risk
taking banks, especially as we assume that their return technology is
simply a fair bet on the riskless rate4. The net profit for the prudent
bank and for the risky bank respectively under pooling would be given
4In future work we plan to investigate further the possibility of free entry for mim-
ics but entry barriers for prudent banks. In this paper we assume a fixed proportion
of risky institutions.
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by the following expressions:
piP = (α(1 + k)− rd)− ηk (1)
piR = p(α(1 + k)− rd)− ηk (2)
And the return on equity for the two types of banks (prudent and
risky respectively) would be:
RoEP = (α(1 + k)− rd)/k (3)
RoER = p(α(1 + k)− rd)/k. (4)
Proposition 1 Bank capital is a costly signal and potentially allows a
prudent bank to separate from risky banks in equilibrium.
To see this note that it is costly for both prudent and risky banks to
increase their capital but that the cost of increased capital for a risky
bank is greater than that of a prudent bank. In particular it can be
shown that:
∂piR
∂k
= −(η − αp) < ∂piP
∂k
= −(η − α) < 0 (5)
In order to introduce capital regulation to the analysis, it is useful to
consider the objective function of a regulator. One objective of the bank-
ing regulatory authorities is normally to minimise the expected losses for
the deposit insurance system imposed on society if banks fail. A natural
definition of those losses would be (1− p)L(1− ω) where (1− p) is the
probability of risky bank loans failing, ω is the proportion of safe banks
in the population and L is the leverage of banks L = (1 + k)/k. Hence
as the proportion of safe banks, ω, declines, the losses move towards
a maximum value of (1 − p)L. Suppose a bank regulatory authorities
wish to minimise the amount of expected losses to the deposit insurance
scheme but with the minimum use of bank capital. Hence the regulators’
loss function would be given by:
∆ = (1− p)(1− ω)L(k) + λk (6)
where λ is a preference parameter of the regulator representing the
disutility of an extra unit of capital in banks. Note that Lk < 0 and
5
Lkk > 0. Minimising this loss function with respect to capital, for the
case of a pooling equilibrium regulators would then set an optimal level
of capital as follows:
k =
√
(1− p)(1− ω)/λ (7)
For a set of particular parameter values, an optimal bank capital level
that minimises the loss function, assuming risky and prudent banks co-
exist, is illustrated in Figure 1.
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minimizes the loss function 
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Figure 1: The Regulator’s Loss Function Assuming Prudent and
Risky Banks Co-Exist
Proposition 2 Bank capital regulation may allow for a separating equi-
librium with return on equity maximising banks with a rule that sets
minimum capital less than that of the ”no-gambling constraint”, but a
pooling equilibrium may also be feasible depending on parameter values
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The regulator could simply set minimum capital requirements to as-
sure separation and drive out the risky banks from the market. This is
the approach taken by HMS. Let us call this level of capital:
k∗ =
p(α− rd)
η − αp (8)
Minimum capital requirements would then be set at this level such
that banks would have to satisfy this ”no-gambling constraint”, and risky
banks would be driven out from the market. We illustrate this in Figure
2, where for the parameter values we have chosen the level of capital
which leads to separation, k∗, is around 0.43 or a capital to assets ratio
(k∗/(1 + k∗)) of about 30%. However, setting this high level of capital
is not strictly necessary. Minimum capital requirements could be set at
a lower level but such that the prudent banks would still prefer to have
capital higher than the no gambling constraint rather than this lower
capital level and with risky and prudent banks co-existing (compare
Figure 2). For return on equity maximising banks, the critical lower
level of capital, kmin, where profits with pooling would be equal to that
of separation at the capital level of k∗ would be given by the following
equation:
α(1 + k∗)− r
k∗
=
α(1 + kmin)− rd
kmin
(9)
Manipulating this equation we find that:
kmin = k
∗α− rd
α− r (10)
which is clearly less than k∗ as α−rd
α−r < 1. Hence the regulator may
set minimum capital requirements at kmin, prudent banks would set their
capital to k∗ and risky banks would be driven out of the financial system.
In Figure 2, the minimum capital requirement to ensure separation, kmin,
is around 0.255 or a capital to assets ratio of 20%.
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1. Regulators could set 
this level for minimum 
capital requirements, kmin, 
and prudent banks would 
prefer to separate 
2. Prudent banks would 
have capital at this 
level to separate  
Capital of prudent banks above min. capital requirements 
Figure 2: A Minimum Capital Requirement Could Prompt
Prudent Banks to Separate
Regulators who set capital requirements may wish to consider three
possibilities in order to determine the optimal capital regulation, a) no
capital regulation b) capital regulation that results in a pooling equilib-
rium and c) tougher capital regulation that prompts prudent banks to
set capital requirements such that risky banks exit the market. If banks
maximise rates of return on equity, then for the case with no regulation
and assuming a fixed proportion of risky banks it can be shown that
leverage and hence the regulator’s loss function would actually tend to
infinity so the regulator would always prefer to have some level of capital
regulation5. In case (c), where risky banks are driven out of the system,
the value of the loss function would be λk∗. Let us call the optimal
capital requirement under pooling to be kp < k∗. This would then be
preferred to the separating equilibrium if (1−p)(1−ω)L(kp)+λkp < λk∗
which would be the case if the disutility of capital were high enough. In
particular the pooling equilibrium would be preferred if:
λ >
(1− p)(1− ω)L(kp)
k∗ − kp (11)
5In our set up with a fixed amount of deposits this is not the case for profit
maximising banks. However, if there are constant or increasing returns to scale,
banks may expand and earn more profits and again prudent banks may prefer to
be large with low equity in a pooling equilibrium compared to having higher equity
and separation. In further work, we plan to investigate the implications of different
objectives and scale.
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Hence, to put this another way, if the regulator’s preference function
gives enough weight to the expected losses relative to the disutility of
bank capital, regulators would fix a relatively high minimum capital
requirement and banks would hold excess capital over those requirements
and risky banks would be driven out of the system.
2.2 Introducing deposit insurance
Introducing deposit insurance changes the results above. With full de-
posit insurance banks would drive rd down to the riskless rate, r and the
deposit interest rate is then invariant to the share of the population of
banks that are risky. To force separation, prudent banks now need to
set their capital levels higher than the critical level of capital given by:
k∗∗ =
p(α− r)
η − r (12)
where k∗∗ > k∗.
Proposition 3 In the case of deposit insurance a minimum capital rule
may also force separation but in this case the regulator must fix the min-
imum capital rule equal to the no-gambling constraint
Note that in this case separation brings no special benefits to the pru-
dent banks as all banks pay the riskless rate for deposits. The proposition
then follows directly, in order for a bank regulator to force separation,
minimum capital requirements must be set at:
k∗∗ =
p(α− r)
η − αp (13)
such that risky banks are forced out of the market. The banking
regulator in this environment must now compare the value of the loss
function of forcing out the risky banks, namely ∆ = λk∗∗, with the
value of the loss function setting minimum capital to the optimal level
assuming pooling,
∆ = (1− p)(1− ω)L(kp) + λkp (14)
Hence the pooling equilibrium is preferred if:
λ >
(1− p)(1− ω)L(kp)
k∗∗ − kp (15)
9
Note that (1−p)(1−ω)L(k
p)
k∗∗−kp <
(1−p)(1−ω)L(kp)
K∗−kp . In other words the pooling
equilibrium may be preferred at lower values of λ in the presence of
deposit insurance. This follows because if there is deposit insurance,
then higher capital is required to force out the risky banks and ensure
there is separation.
2.3 The role of banking supervision
However, banking oversight consists of supervising as well as regulating,
or in other words supervisors conduct on-site as well as off-site inspec-
tions to check on banks’ activities. In this model we assume capital is
observable and hence supervisors do not need to spend resources to check
capital levels. Rather, we suggest that a role of bank supervision is to
detect directly if banks are prudent or they are risky. Let us suppose
that banking regulators inspect all banks at cost c and with a probability
s detect if each bank is a risky bank and in that case can close the bank
down without further costs. The loss function of the regulator may be
represented as follows,
∆ = (1− p)(1− ω)(1− s)L(k) + λk + c. (16)
The benefit of detecting risky banks ex ante is that risky banks are
closed without further costs thus reducing expected losses6. In this sec-
tion we take the case where there is deposit insurance. Now reconsider
the optimal minimum capital rule that the regulator would adopt assum-
ing a pooling equilibrium and assuming that the authorities would also
wish to supervise. Minimising the loss function with respect to capital,
the relevant first order condition is now (1− p)(1− ω)(1− s)Lk + λ = 0
or in other words, λ = −Lk(1 − p)(1 − ω)(1 − s). Remembering that
L = (1 + k)/k, Lk = −1/k2. Hence we find that the optimal capital
level for the regulator would be:
ks =
√
(1− p)(1− ω)(1− s)
λ
(17)
where ks is the optimal capital level of the regulator assuming pooling
in the existence of banking supervision. Note that ∂k
s
∂s
< 0 or in other
words, if the technology of supervision improves such that the detection
6It is clearly an extreme assumption that risky banks can be closed down ex ante
without further costs. In a more complex model supervisors may weigh the costs of
closing a bank ex ante versus the risks of higher closing costs ex post if risky banks
are allowed to continue to operate. The probability that a risky bank may not need
to be closed at all, also raises the issue of regulatory forbearance that we discuss in
the conclusions below.
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rate s increases, at the same level of costs, then the optimal capital level
decreases. For a positive detection rate, s > 0, it is clear that ks < kp.
Banking supervision is then complementary to a minimum capital ratio.
Figure 3 compares the optimal capital regulation under pooling with and
without supervision. As can be seen as the technology of supervision
improves (higher s for a constant c), optimal capital requirements fall.
	  
Figure 3: Banking Supervision is Complementary to Capital
Regulation
Now regulators must determine if it is better to opt for a high capital
ratio that drives out the risky banks or a lower capital ratio such that
there is pooling and use a combination of supervision and capital require-
ments7. Note that supervision changes the minimum capital level that
the regulator must fix to force the risky banks to exit. With banking
supervision, risky banks’ expected profts may be written as follows piR =
(1− p)(1− s)(α(1 + k)− rd)− ηk. The minimum capital requirement
that then forces the ex ante expected profits of the risky banks to zero
is given by:
7We assume that under the pooling equilibrium it is better for the regulator to
invest in supervision rather than rely solely on capital regulation, in other words we
assume that (1− p)(1−w)(1− s)L(ks) + λks + c < (1− p)(1−ω)(1− s)L(kp) + λkp
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k∗∗∗ =
p(1− s)(α− r)
η − αp(1− s) (18)
Note that ∂k
∗∗∗
∂s
< 0 and so as the technology of supervision improves
(a higher s assuming costs remain constant) then the minimum capital
that the regulator must set to ensure separation decreases. It follows
that k∗∗ (derived in the previous section) is simply a special case of k∗∗∗
when the detection rate, s, is equal to zero. For positive s, it follows
that k∗∗∗ < k∗∗.
The regulator must then compare the value of the loss function set-
ting minimum capital regulations to a level that would drive out the
risky banks and eliminate expected losses, which would be given by,
∆ = λk∗∗∗, with the value of the loss function if capital is set at a lower
level, ks < k∗∗∗ , where ks is the optimal capital ratio assuming pooling
in the presence of supervision. The value of the regulator’s loss function
in that case will be ∆ = (1 − p)(1 − ω)(1 − s)L(ks) + λks + c. The
regulator will prefer to opt for the pooling equilibrium when:
λ >
(1− p)(1− ω)(1− s)L(ks) + c
k∗∗∗ − ks (19)
Note that ks < kp and hence L(ks) > L(ks) and so formally it is
ambiguous whether the regulator would prefer the pooling equilibrium
with lower levels of λ when there is banking supervision compared to the
case where there is no banking supervision. However, if under pooling
the loss function of the regulator is reduced by introducing banking
supervision ie: if (1−p)(1−ω)(1−s)L(ks)+λks+c < (1−p)(1−ω)(1−
s)L(kp)+λkp, then it must also be the case that the pooling equilibrium
is preferred for higher levels of λ8.
2.4 Financial innovation
In the above we have discussed the case of prudent and risky banks where
prudent banks have access to good clients whereas risky banks are as-
sumed not to have these relationships and can only take fair gambles on
the riskless rate of interest. In the absence of regulation and supervi-
sion and even if there is no deposit insurance, the presence of such risky
lenders imply risks for depositors or if they are insured, the deposit in-
surance system. Capital regulation and ex ante bank supervision may
be used, even in the presence of deposit insurance, to counteract these
8The proof of this is to be included in an appendix to be completed.
12
problems. However, the explosion of new financial products and instru-
ments to transform risks has surely had a dramatic impact on traditional
finance. On the one hand financial innovation may create value but on
the other hand new instruments may also be used to transform return
distributions in ways that may be very hard for banking supervisors (or
bank depositors) to be aware of, making ex ante detection of risk-taking
much more problematic. In this section we therefore model financial
innovation as both potentially a good but also potentially as exacerbat-
ing the information problems. To be specific, we suppose that financial
innovation leads to two effects, first it adds value by increasing α, the
return available to the prudent banks, but second it also decreases the
detection probability, s, of the banking supervisor.
To model this we now assume that the detection probability is s(1−
(1− θ)ν), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, ν > 0, and that the return available to the prudent
bank is now α(1 + θν). Hence ν may be interpreted as the amount of
financial innovation and θ may be interpreted as the extent to which
financial innovation adds value. For θ = 1, financial innovation is only
a good, whereas for θ = 0, financial innovation adds no value and only
serves to undermine the detection technology of the regulator. Note that
if the return of prudent banks rise due to ”good” financial innovation,
then risky banks must also increase their returns to mimic the prudent
institutions. Hence we now have that pα(1 + θν) = r or p = r
α(1+θν)
.
Hence it follows that even if financial innovation only adds value (and
does not undermine supervision), then financial innovation increases the
probability that the risky banks will fail. The regulator’s loss function
now becomes:
∆ = (1− p)(1− ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν)L(k) + λk + c (20)
If there is a pooling equilibrium then the optimal minimum capital
ratio for the regulator to set would be such that, λ = (1−p)s(1−ω)(1−
(1− θ)ν)Lk or we can write the optimal capital ratio as:
ki =
√
(1− p)(1− ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν))
λ
(21)
where ki is the optimal minimum capital for the regulator in the
presence of financial innovation. Note that assuming pooling, the opti-
mal capital ratio rises as θ falls or in other words if financial innovation
is more related to avoiding detection by the supervisor, then optimal
capital requirements will rise. On the other hand, δki
δν
> 0, i.e. an in-
crease in the amount of financial innovation leads to an increase of the
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optimal minimum capital. This still holds even if θ = 1, i.e. even when
financial innovation is only about adding value (see the Appendix). Why
is this the case? As mentioned above, an increase in ν leads to an in-
crease in the probability that risky banks will fail. Financial innovation,
even if it is only a good, will lead to higher risks in the financial system
and therefore higher expected losses for the regulator, represented by
(1−p)(1−ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν)L(k) in the loss function (equation (27)
and (28) in the Appendix).
Once again, the regulator must decide whether it is better to set
minimum capital levels such that risky banks are driven out of the mar-
ket or at lower capital levels such that risky and prudent banks coexist.
The capital level that drives the profits of the risky banks to zero and
so ensures separation is now given by:
k∗∗∗∗ =
p(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν))(α(1 + θν)− r)
η − α(1 + θν)p(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν) (22)
and if bank capital were set at that level, then the value of the
regulator’s loss function would be λk∗∗∗∗. It can be shown that k∗∗∗∗
increases with both an increase in ν and is increasing in θ. If regulators
set the minimum capital level at ki then the value of the loss function
would be, ∆ = (1 − p)(1 − ω)(1 − s(1 − (1 − θ)ν))L(ki) + λki + c and
it can be shown that the latter would be preferred when:
λ >
(1− p)(1− ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν))L(ks) + c
k∗∗∗∗ − ki (23)
Let us assume that parameters are such that the regulator would
prefer the pooling equilibrium to that of separation. It can be shown that
the change in the value of the regulator’s loss function given a change in
ν is given by d∆
dν
= (1−p)(1−ω)s(1−θ)L(ki) > 0. Hence for θ < 1 and
for s > 0, greater financial innovation (higher ν) leads to higher values
of the loss function of the regulator. For small changes in ν this direct
effect is the only one as the loss function is minimised with respect to the
optimal level of bank capital. However, for θ < 1 and for s > 0 and for
large changes in ν, the optimal level of bank capital from the regulator’s
standpoint would also rise in an attempt to counteract the declining
power of banking supervision to detect risky banks. In Figure 4, we
illustrate how optimal minimum bank capital requirements increase as
financial innovation advances. We plot the relationship for two levels
of theta. For high theta where financial innovation is largely a good,
optimal capital requirements are higher and increase faster with the
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amount of financial innovation. Even though financial innovation is of
higher quality, capital requirements need to be higher, as expected losses
increase with the increase in θ. This also affects the losses positively
through an increase in (1 − p). At low levels of theta, even though
financial innovation is largely about undermining the detection powers
of supervisors, capital requirements still rise but at a lower level and
with a lower gradient.
	  
Figure 4: Optimal Capital Requirements given Financial
Innovation
In Figure 5, we plot the values of the regulator’s loss function. Again
we plot the relationship for high and for low theta. As is expected, the
loss function increases as financial innovation advances. And the loss
function is at a higher level and increases faster for high θ, where the
probability of failure decreases compared to the low θ case. We plot two
schedules for each value of θ. The lower schedules correspond to the case
where the supervisor realises her detection powers are being undermined
and so adjusts capital requirements accordingly, as illustrated in figure
5. The higher schedules correspond to the case where the supervisor
does not adjust capital requirements as financial innovation progresses,
15
as they do not realise their powers of detection are reduced or perhaps
for legal or other reasons. Note that in this case the loss function is at a
higher level and increases more rapidly as financial innovation proceeds.
	  Figure 5: Regulator Loss Function with Financial Innovation:
When Innovation has High and Low Value Added
Let us assume parameters are such that the regulator prefers to sepa-
rate prudent banks from the risky institutions. As mentioned above both
increases in v and θ lead to an increase in the level of capital required to
ensure separation, k∗∗∗∗. As the amount of financial innovation increases
the return of prudent banks rise and it becomes more difficult for the
supervisor to detect risky banks and hence the rate of return for risky
institutions also increases. Prudent banks therefore need to accumulate
a higher level of k in order to push risky banks rate of return below their
cost of capital, i.e. to zero profits. Financial innovation then increases
the social inefficiency of signalling and the more innovation that has
occurred then the more likely it is for the supervisor to opt for pooling.
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3 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a relatively simple signaling model to
investigate the potential implications of financial innovation for banking
regulation and supervision. We argue that capital regulation may aid
prudent banks to separate from their risky peers. Indeed regulators may
set minimum capital levels such that prudent banks would wish to hold
capital buffers over these requirements to ensure separation. However,
with deposit insurance the capital required for separation is higher and
the regulator would have to set capital levels to directly ensure that
a ”no gambling” constraint is met. It is assumed that the regulatory
authorities trade off the expected losses on a deposit insurance scheme
against the level of capital held by banks. Depending on parameter
values, pooling may be preferred to separation. If prudent and risky
banks co-exist, supervision (i.e. the ability to detect and close risky
banks ex ante) is shown to be complementary to regulation and better
supervision (a higher detection rate of risky banks) would lead to lower
optimal minimum capital ratios from the standpoint of the regulator.
We model two effects of financial innovation; namely that it adds
value but secondly that it makes the job of supervisors more difficult
by undermining their powers to detect risky institutions. We argue that
before the global economic crisis, financial innovation had precisely this
dual impact as while it may have helped diversify risks and improved
efficiency in terms of allowing risks to be held by those best able to
bear them, it also allows institutions to arbitrage regulations or other-
wise hide relevant risks from the regulator. We show that to the extent
that financial innovation undermined supervision, optimal capital levels
should be higher in the pooling equilibrium. Moreover, as financial inno-
vation increases the returns for prudent banks, risky banks that attempt
to mimic prudent ones have to take greater risks. Hence even if financial
innovation has been all about increasing returns and not about under-
mining supervisory detection capabilities, financial innovation still leads
to an increased risk of bank failures. Moreover, if innovation under-
mines the powers of detection of banking supervisors, there is a question
as to whether the supervisor is aware that this has happened. If the
supervisor is aware then optimal capital regulation would adjust but if
not then capital regulation may be set too low. We have not considered
here the possibility that supervisors were aware that financial innovation
had undermined their supervisory power, however, decided not to act by
increasing capital requirements9.
9This might be due to regulatory capture or forbearance, which are cited for ex-
ample in the case of the Savings and Loans crisis in the US. Capture and forbearance
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One might conclude from our results that capital regulations do not
work and we should leave financial institutions themselves demonstrate
their solvency and allay investors’ fears. Our model cautions against
this approach. Capital regulation, even without the existence of de-
posit insurance, may be required to rule out both prudent and risky
banks maximising returns through very high leverage. However, with
deposit insurance, higher levels of capital requirements may be needed
to force separation of prudent banks from their counterparts. Moreover,
financial innovation strongly increases the amount of capital required to
force separation, increasing the social inefficiency of signaling to ensure
separation.
In our view the issues discussed in this paper are highly relevant to
the period preceding the recent global financial crisis, which was marked
by the co-existence of prudent as well as risky banks. Financial innova-
tion and the explosion of complex financial instruments allowed banks
to adjust the riskiness of their asset portfolios at will and mimic high re-
turns. Regulators appeared to be unaware of the actual risks being taken
and supervisors were unable to distinguish between prudent banks and
risky institutions, at least until the latter’s luck ran out.
We suggest policy implications in four directions:
First, we argue that institutional arrangements that limit the use of
complex instruments may be appropriate, in particular for core banks
that have large amounts of insured liabilities. In this regard it is inter-
esting to note that many emerging economies including those of Latin
America escaped the worst of the recent financial crisis. One view is
that this was simply because their financial systems were less developed
and so the stock of complex instruments issued had not grown to the
extent witnessed in developed countries’ financial markets. However, a
second view is that the legal and cultural environment is very different.
To a first approximation, Latin American banks are not allowed to trade
new products unless they are specifically authorised to do so. This is in
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon approach, where banks are allowed to trade
new instruments unless they are prohibited from doing so. This observa-
tion, while crude and likely too extreme, suggests a somewhat different
explanation. Namely, banks in Latin America resemble more the ”utility
company” model rather than a sophisticated investment banking model
due largely to the legal and regulatory culture and indeed this has been
are also considered as a serious problem in the work by Barth, Caprio and Levine
(2006). Following this perspective, the market may be employed as a further disci-
plining device, and in fact should be seen as complementary to supervisory discipline.
Or, to put it another way, market mechanisms may help to discipline the supervisor
and ensure prompt corrective action is actually prompt.
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an important factor in limiting the development of those markets, per-
haps to their advantage. This suggestion is also in line with the latest
report of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) chaired
by Sir John Vickers, which not only recommends to ring-fence, i.e. to
insulate vital banking services on which households and SMEs depend
from problems elsewhere in the financial system, but also ban those
ring-fenced banks from providing a wide range of risky activities (ICB
2011).
Second, we do suggest that higher levels of bank capital are required
in order to limit the incentives for risk-taking and limit the number
of risk-taking banks. This also follows the suggestions by the ICB re-
port, which require ring-fenced banks to accumulate a capital backing of
roughly 10 % of assets at risk in equity and 10 % in the form of Cocos.
Third we suggest that supervision should be seen as complementary
to capital requirements and that banking supervisors should evaluate,
not just whether banks are complying with particular regulations, but
rather assess the overall riskiness of the operations of banks. To the ex-
tent that banking supervisors do not feel comfortable with assessing the
risk of a particular institution, this is in itself evidence that the institu-
tional rules limiting complexity are insufficient and capital requirements
should be raised further.
Finally, we advocate the potential use of Cocos, as a means for banks
to obtain higher levels of equity but also as an automatic market-based
trigger, perhaps set at levels where the bank remains solvent, to guard
against problems of regulatory forbearance.
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Appendix: Behaviour of minimum capital ratio ki in
pooling equilibrium
The regulator’s loss function is:
∆ = (1− p)(1− ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν)L(k) + λk + c (24)
Optimal capital ratio is:
ki =
√
(1− p)(1− ω)(1− s(1− (1− θ)ν))
λ
(25)
First derivative of ki w.r.t. theta:
δki
δθ
=
ν(ω − 1)(αs(νθ + 1)2 − r(vs+ 1))
2αλ(νθ + 1)2
√
(ω−1)(νθα+α−r)
αλ(νθ+1)
< 0 (26)
This is negative as ω < 1.
First derivative of ki w.r.t. ν:
δki
δv
=
(ω − 1)(α(θ − 1)s(θν + 1)2 + r(s− θ))
2αλ(θν + 1)2
√
(ω−1)(s((θ−1)ν+1)−1)(αθν+α−r)
αλ(θν+1)
> 0 (27)
For θ < 1, this is positive, as (θ − 1) < 0, (ω − 1) < 0 and assuming
s < θ. If θ = 1, this becomes
δki
δν
=
(ω − 1)r(s− 1)
2αλ(ν + 1)2
√
(ω−1)(s−1)(αν+α−r)
αλ(ν+1)
(28)
which is still > 0.
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